The “M” That Enables the “D”
Reconsidering Military Power in an Age of Deterrence
Timothy Payment ‘97, adjunct professor of political science and a retired U.S. Army Officer.
As a Soldier, he served in Bosnia (1999), Iraq (2003-04 and 2007), Afghanistan (2010 and 2018), Germany/Poland/Baltic States (2001-2005, 2014-2017, 2020-2025). In Poland, he established the first permanently assigned U.S. Army Headquarters in Poznan in 2021.
COL (Retired) Payment is available timothy.payment@kwc.edu
Professor Holbrook’s recent essay, “New START Stops: A Diplomat’s Case for Nuclear Arms Control,” offers a thoughtful and timely reminder that diplomacy, sustained engagement, and arms control have played a central role in reducing nuclear risk over the past several decades. His perspective is both valuable and necessary.
What follows is not intended to challenge that argument, but to build upon it. In national security practice, we often think in terms of the instruments of national power, commonly referred to as DIME, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. These are the tools a nation uses to influence events, shape the behavior of others, and protect its interests short of, and if necessary, during conflict. While they are often discussed separately, they are most effective when used together.
This piece focuses on one dimension that is frequently understood but less often examined in detail: the role of the military instrument of power, the “M” in DIME, in enabling the kind of diplomacy Holbrook rightly emphasizes. If diplomacy is to be effective in reducing strategic risk, it must rest on a foundation of credible deterrence. The purpose here is to highlight how that military foundation operates in practice, and how it supports the broader objective implicit throughout Holbrook’s argument, protecting U.S. interests while reducing the risk of nuclear war.
Holbrook reminds us of an enduring reality. The prevention of nuclear war has depended not merely on good fortune, but on sustained diplomacy, negotiated agreements, and continuous engagement among major powers.
Yet diplomacy has never existed in isolation. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, successful diplomatic efforts have rested on a foundation of credible national power. Military power plays a unique role. It is not an alternative to diplomacy. It is one of its enablers.
In uniform, I learned a simple lesson that still holds. Diplomacy and deterrence are not competing concepts. They are complementary functions. Deterrence creates strategic space. Diplomacy uses that space. If deterrence fails, diplomacy operates under pressure. If diplomacy is absent, deterrence has no political end state.
That is not theory. It is how strategy works in practice.
Credible Power and Strategic Outcomes
The current National Security Strategy places renewed emphasis on military strength and deterrence. That has generated debate, as it always does. I would not describe it as a departure. I would describe it as a return to fundamentals.
Military capability matters, but capability alone is not strategy. The real question is whether a capability strengthens deterrence, reassures allies, and contributes to stability.
Within the broader framework of national power, the military serves a distinct purpose. It communicates resolve, shapes how adversaries assess risk, and reinforces the credibility of political commitments. Diplomacy then turns that credibility into outcomes such as agreements, deconfliction, and reduced tensions when possible.
We have seen this before. During the Cold War, arms control agreements did not eliminate mistrust. They imposed structure on it. Verification regimes did not create trust. They created predictability.
During my own career, I found that unpredictability often created more risk than capability itself. Nations can live with what they understand. What drives escalation is uncertainty, misreading intent, misjudging capability, or assuming the worst under pressure. That is why verification matters.
This is one of the enduring lessons of the profession of arms. Tactical success and strategic success are not the same thing. Soldiers can create opportunities. They cannot, by themselves, produce lasting political outcomes. That requires diplomacy, supported by credible deterrence.
Holbrook’s discussion of arms control, inspections, and verification reflects this reality. Stability is rarely the product of trust alone. More often, it is the product of transparency, predictability, and a shared understanding of risk.
Europe: Deterrence You Can See
If you want to understand how deterrence supports diplomacy, you do not need theory. You can look at Europe.
NATO maintains a forward presence along its eastern flank, supported by multinational forces, forward headquarters, rotational units, integrated air and missile defense, and a persistent allied presence. These are not symbolic deployments. They are designed to ensure that any aggression immediately involves multiple members of the alliance.
Exercises reinforce that posture. Large-scale multinational training brings together U.S. and allied forces to operate as a combined force across borders, domains, and command structures.
That is what deterrence looks like in practice:
- forces that are present
- headquarters that can command
- logistics that can sustain
- alliances that function under pressure
In my experience, allies do not feel reassured by theory. They are reassured by what they can see. That means forces on the ground, command relationships that work, and a posture that can respond before a crisis outruns decision-making.
NATO has adapted its approach over time. What was once a limited presence intended to signal commitment has evolved into a more capable posture designed to prevent an adversary from achieving its objectives quickly. That shift reflects experience.
Deterrence is not static. It evolves with the threat.
Why Iran Matters in the Same Framework
Europe provides a familiar deterrence model. Iran presents a different challenge, but the same strategic logic applies.
Iran operates below the threshold of conventional conflict, relying on proxies, asymmetric capabilities, and gradual escalation. That complicates deterrence. The boundaries are less clear, and decisions are often made under compressed timelines.
At the center of that challenge is the nuclear question.
Military power alone cannot resolve that problem. It can deter certain actions and shape the environment. It cannot produce a durable outcome.
At the same time, diplomacy without leverage has historically struggled to influence behavior over the long term.
Over the course of my career, I saw that pattern more than once. When pressure was credible, diplomacy had traction. When it was not, progress was uneven at best.
That is not a political observation. It is a practical one.
Holbrook’s emphasis on agreements, inspections, and verification applies directly here. If the objective is to limit nuclear risk, diplomacy remains essential. It becomes more effective when backed by credible deterrence.
The principle is consistent. Deterrence establishes conditions. Diplomacy shapes outcomes.
The Strategic Imperative of Integration
Having served through the post-Cold War period, the conflicts after September 11, and now the return of great-power competition, I have become convinced that deterrence and diplomacy succeed or fail together.
The strategic environment has changed, but that fundamental relationship has not.
Military power can create options and buy time. It cannot produce stability on its own. Diplomacy can reduce risk. It is far more effective when supported by credible capability.
That is where integration matters.
The United States does not lack strength. The question is how that strength is applied. Not every capability contributes equally to deterrence. Not every deployment strengthens stability.
A military designed solely for warfighting risks missing its most important function. A diplomatic effort unsupported by credible power risks irrelevance.
The objective is not balance for its own sake. The objective is alignment. Military, diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts must reinforce one another if strategy is to succeed.
Conclusion: Continuity, Not Contrast
Holbrook is right to emphasize diplomacy, arms control, and verification.
The current strategy is right to emphasize deterrence, prioritization, and credible capability.
These are not competing approaches. They are complementary.
The objective that runs throughout Holbrook’s argument—protecting U.S. interests while reducing the risk of nuclear war—cannot be achieved by diplomacy alone. It cannot be achieved by military power alone. It requires both.
In Europe, that relationship is visible in forward forces and integrated alliances.
In the Middle East, particularly with Iran, it is visible in the need to combine pressure, deterrence, and diplomacy to manage escalation and reduce nuclear risk.
The lesson is not new. It remains essential.
Deterrence creates the conditions in which diplomacy can operate. Diplomacy reduces the risks that deterrence cannot eliminate.
Together, they form the foundation of a strategy aimed not at winning wars, but at preventing them.